Sea. Wang Gongwu (1990) pointed out that the Hokkien merchant network in Southeast Asian operated outside of the protection of the Chinese state. This network had to develop its own trust building mechanisms. Most City God temples come equipped with a great abacus for calculating the true and the false, one's merits and demerits. This is Confucian morality brought down to the most instrumental level -and calculated on an abacus. These were among the key techniques developed within the Chinese trading system to develop trust in business partners in long distance trade ventures, in the absence of state sanctions.
Of course, underlying and funding many of these temples were the great Chinese business families and extended lineages, the different dialect groups and their huiguan (regional business associations) and tongxianghui (native place associations), and the brotherhoods that enforced their mutually exclusive limits and economic niches. Yet all of these institutions had altars dedicated to the gods of their distinct regional pantheons, and they conducted rituals before their altars on a regular basis. Each trade association had its own temple. Each brotherhood had its rituals (ter Haar, 1998) . And each family had its own altar for the worship of their ancestors and the gods of their local dialect and regional pantheons. One could go so far as to say that the Chinese family was primarily a ritual unit, rather than a biological unit. We have more to learn about the role of and the interaction between the Chinese temple, family-lineage, and native place association networks in Southeast Asia in building long distance trust networks.
Some religious networks, for example Buddhist traders or monks, may have seen themselves as somehow free of or detached from political concerns, or even nonpolitical. Not just in terms of their evasion of different political powers encountered along their routes. Some religious networks reject national identities in place of either more local identities or more universal identities. One needs to respect the utopian power that can be found within many such religious networks, as these values motivated people to transfer wealth into religious merit and temple building, to re-circulate their wealth through charities, or more radically, to direct their profits into ritual fasting, and establish mechanisms to ensure that their earnings support the network only in order to support the Dharma.
The networks examined in this paper moved and continue to flow past political borders and boundaries. They are incredibly flexible and develop fluid networking strategies. Many transcend or reshape ethnic or kinship boundaries while bringing their members into very specific regimes of exchange and reciprocity and mobilization.2 New religious networks in Southeast Asia have continually layered themselves onto the kalaidescopic pattern of preexisting networks, drawing upon the reservoir of shared symbolic capital within these networks, redirecting these resources towards their own ends, sometimes moralizing or expanding the sense of the self, or introducing a sense of belonging to a universal community beyond the bounds of the nation or any ethnicity.
Of course there was a darker side to these networks as well, as many displayed extreme forms of exclusivity and the capture of all kinds of forces, from human labor to gender roles. There are also issues of competition and conversion within and between religious networks and communities, and some cases of wholescale conversion of elements of one network into another.
The networks discussed in the paper can also be seen as part of the ongoing expansion of religious connectivity and communication in Asia. Many networks are now exploring contemporary techniques and using new technologies to spread their message(s) and connect their adherents together across Southeast Asia and the world as a whole.
Ritual Revolutions
On the 100 th anniversary of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, it is important to recall the key role of the Chinese Overseas in this vital turning point in modern Chinese history. As revolutionaries, reformers, financial backers, promoters of educational and social reform, the Chinese Overseas acted as a force of modernity. They were active proponents of modernization. One thinks of figures like Tang Kah Kee (1874 Kee ( -1961 , based in Singapore, who played very active roles in reform movements -sponsoring colleges and educational reform, advocating for social reforms, encouraging urban planning and village regulation and reconstruction, and contributing to a new architectural style.
Anti-imperialist revolts led by leaders with ties to Chinese Overseas can be traced back further into the 19 th century in Fujian. One of the leaders of the Xiaodaohui (Small Knives) revolt was the son of a Chinese Overseas merchant. The role of Chinese overseas in leading or bankrolling military forces can also be seen in the local defense corps active in the 1920s in Jinjiang that were sponsored by the Chinese overseas in Philippines But there was another side to the impact of the Chinese Overseas on their home communities, namely the preservation (or re-invention) of tradition. Many Chinese Overseas supported the building of ancestral halls and temples in their home villages. Religion and ritual played a major role in their community enclaves overseas, where they sponsored and participated in branch temples whose incense was carried from founding temples in their ancestral villages in Southern China. From this perspective, Chinese overseas can be seen as a force of tradition and the preservation of culture.
The Chinese Overseas are often discussed in terms of the major turning points of Chinese modern history -the Xinhai Revolution, in which their support played a crucial role, the establishment of the CCP, when many Chinese Overseas went back to China to contribute to the socialist experiment, the Cultural Revolution, during which many Chinese Overseas felt abandoned by China, and determined to preserve their cultural traditions during that iconoclastic era., and finally the Deng era, in which the Chinese Overseas have recovered their earlier role as leading innovators, but primarily as investors, factory owners, and financial speculators. These Chinese Overseas business leaders have been described by Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini as flexible citizens of an ungrounded empire (Ong and Nonini, 1997; Ong 1999) .
The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a fundamental shift in global capitalism as it developed systems of flexible accumulation, characterized by rapid flows of financial capital, outsourcing of factories to areas with cheap labor, and the development of a cadre of technical mid-level office workers and technicians, along with an elite of high-flying capitalist business leaders and financiers. These economic changes profoundly affected the corridors linking Chinese overseas with their home villages and regions in China. Business leaders became flexible citizens and harbingers of an alternative Asian modernity (Ong and Nonini1997; Ong 1999) . But as they also point out, laborers were also forced into new patterns of mobility, as were mid-level office workers. These changes occurred simultaneously with political overtures that opened the blocked networks of the extended Chinese Overseas transnational spaces. From this perspective, the Chinese Overseas in the last few decades can be seen as a force of flexible capitalism under conditions of globalization.
This essay sets out to problematize some of these categories, oppositions and understandings. The first issue is the very nature of the Chinese Overseas. As Philip Kuhn (2009) has pointed out in his sweeping overview Chinese Amongst Others, many Chinese overseas conceived of themselves as sojourners abroad, living and moving within corridors linking their spaces of operation in Southeast Asia to their home village or region -these corridors are a kind of translocal stretching of space. In a recent paper (Dean, n.d.) , I have sketched out a continuum of qiaoxiang (Sojourner villages), from those in which only a handful of families or surname groups have exclusive footholds abroad, to villages in which virtually every household has relatives in Southeast Asia. The spatial imaginary of these villagers is very extensive, and not only imaginary -by joining into chain-migration networks, villagers can and do move back and forth from their villages in China to Southeast Asia and beyond. And as Peggy Levitt (2004 Levitt ( , 2007 reminds us, gods do not need passports.
A second issue is the diversity of Chinese Overseas. They are members of many distinct regional cultures, and speak many different dialects. They also worship gods from each of their distinct regional pantheons, and practice distinct ritual traditions and ritual forms. In some parts of Southeast Asia, these communities maintain local opera, regional music, regional Daoist ritual specialists, and forms of spirit mediumism specific to their ancestral locales. Moreover, Chinese overseas are often members of multiple networks. Thus they may belong to the regional native-place huiguan, but also to temples linked to their villages of origin, or participate voluntarily in a religious movement that expanded into Southeast Asia form their home region. They very likely will also be sponsors of Buddhist monasteries in Southeast Asia, many of which will be linked through master disciple ties back to their ancestral homes in South and Southeast China.
Thirdly, Chinese overseas are not just preservers of traditions, but also introduced many cultural, social and ritual innovations back into their home regions within China. I will discuss some examples of ritual change that took place in Southeast Asia, and which were then introduced back into the local cultural system in China. I will suggest that this is part of a very long process, stretching back at least 500-600 years -a process which does not easily connect to standard kinds of historical periodization.
The three examples I will discuss here occurred within the ritual networks extending from Putian, Fujian to Southeast Asia. Putian emigration to Southeast Asia was a late phenomenon, compared to the Minnan Hokkien migrations, which has been going on since the 15 th century, if not before. There were of course much earlier records of transnational trading from the Xinghua region, including a Song dynasty inscription from Putian which describes how a Chinese captain sailed to Srijava (most likely to what is now called Pelambang or Zhugang (Great Harbour)), and returned with a hundredfold profit (Dean and Zheng, 1995) . However, large scale Xinghua emigration took place only during the late 19 th and early 20 th century. Upon reaching Singapore and Malaysia they found themselves excluded from most kinds of work by better established immigrant communities such as the Hokkien, the Cantonese, the Hakka, and the Teochow. The Xinghua (Henghwa) sojourners concentrated their efforts in one extremely fast changing niche in the local economy -the transportation industry. Starting out as rickshaw pullers and clerks in British bicycle shops, Xinhua entrepreneurs soon set up their own chain of shops selling bikes and spare parts and repairs. Following the exponential expansion of the industry, which they effectively monopolized through their networks of spare parts distributors, they went into motorcycle, cars and spare parts, public buses, ethanol plants, and Mercedes Benz dealerships. Nowadays some of the Xinghua businessmen are amongst the wealthiest economic leaders in Indonesia. But many of these global business tycoons were also trained as spirit mediums.
The irrigated Putian plain was originally 30 meters under the sea. It was reclaimed from the sea over a 1000 year period. There are four major irrigation systems that converge in this alluvial plain, and every village has a primary, secondary or tertiary irrigation canal running through it. Three of the irrigation systems eventually were integrated into one massive, complex system, which relies on sluice-gates to keep freshwater in the canals during high tide, and releases the diverted river water out the gates during low tide. Around the beginning of the 16 th century, this area saw the establishment of the first ritual alliances, which merged several villages and lineages clustered along a particular canal into multivillage alliances marked by common ritual processions and higher order temples. These temples served as the management center for the irrigation system. They coordinated maintenance of the canals with similar multivillage alliances throughout the irrigation system. Over time 150 such alliances evolved on the Putian plain, into which 724 villages were gathered. Occasionally, it was necessary to call upon the state to rebuild dikes along stretches of reclaimed land along the sea or the river mouth, or to enforce certain ratios of water distribution at key nodes in the system, and to arbitrate over disputes. But given the ever increasing complexity of the irrigation system, the majority of these issues were handled locally, by the higher order temple irrigation committees. By the 19 th century, the irrigation system was in decline, with disputes spreading virally within the system. Tremendous population pressure, competition over water rights, silting up of the canals, and the collapse of state control made it even more difficult to handle conflict within the irrigation system. The villages of the Putian plain broke up into a checkerboard of competing banner alliances, one set of villages against the next. These conflicts simply exacerbated the decline of the system, and water shortages and drought were widespread (Dean and Zheng, 2 vols, 2010) .
These tensions led to increasing emigration, and this emigration generated at least 8 different kinds of translocal or transnational networks: 1) extended-lineage groups, 2) networks based on village temples, 3) networks based on ritual alliance temples, 4) networks of Spirit medium Altar Associations, 5) networks of the 3 in 1 religious movement, 6) networks of master disciple links between Xinghua Buddhist monks, 7) networks of fishermen and smugglers with ancestral homes in the region known as Jiewai (Beyond the Limits -of the Qing dynasty coastal evacuation of the 1660s-1680s), and 8) last but not least, the networks of Methodist pioneer emigrants who began to build a New Jerusalem in Sibu, in the jungles of Borneo in 1910-11, under the leadership of Huang Naishing (Wong Naisong, 1849 -1924 .
Our recent survey of ritual activities in 724 villages on the Putian plain (Dean and Zheng 2010) documents the central role of communal rituals dedicated to the popular gods in the villages of Putian, Fujian. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the change of official policies regarding religious activity in 1979, thousands of temples have been rebuilt, local ritual traditions have been reinvented, and esoteric rites have been slowly reassembled or improvised across the Putian plain. These volumes demonstrate the importance of these rituals dedicated to the gods by the villagers in this region by showing their distribution and frequency in every village on the plain.
We found that village temples, and ritual alliances they have formed, generate a "second government" which addresses certain local concerns more effectively than the state and its local government officials (Dean 2001) . The village temples are at the center of the celebrations of the birthdays and festivals of the gods. They organize processions of villagers that trace the boundaries of their ritual territories and alliances. They hold training sessions for spirit mediums who transmit the blessings of the gods to each household in the village. Village temples also invite Daoist and other ritual specialists to perform rites inside the temple as the processions, spirit medium exorcistic dances, and opera performances go on outside. They are also important centers of local political, economic, social and moral power. The temples are living cultural centers of the villages. During idle moments, they provide a place for the elderly to gather and play cards or mahjong, while individual worshippers burn incense and present offerings to the gods, and children play. Village rituals centered on these temples are continuing to successfully negotiate the forces of capitalism and nationalism while preserving a vibrant space for the celebration of local cultural difference.
What do the complex village rites and processions of the Putian plain tell us about the nature of ritual, community and identity in Southeast China, and beyond into the religious networks stretching to Southeast Asia? Rituals in this area and in these networks incorporate many different liturgical frameworks and allow for multiple points of view, all the while mobilizing the entire village population (or network membership) into celebrations for the gods. These rites are an intensification of everyday life, featuring an acceleration of the flow of gifts and competitive displays of local power, rather than a sacred or solemn time set apart from some mundane realm. And many of these events feature returned Overseas Chinese funding, ritual knowledge, participation, or management at a distance.
Spirit Medium Altar Association Networks 1). The Oversea Chinese Spirit medium tanban Altar
Association network has its origins in the collective training of spirit mediums in the temples of the Jiangkou region of Putian (Dean and Zheng, 1993) . One of the early centers of this tradition was the Jiulidong (Nine Carp Cavern Temple) in Shiting village in Putian. Some of the mediums from this temple traveled to Singapore in the 1920s, where they maintained the cults to their deities on makeshift altars. By the 1950s they had built a temple in Singapore. Further temples in the network were built in Indonesia (in Tibing Tingi and Kirasan in the 1960s, and in Medan and Jakarta in the 1970s). Related temples were built in Serembang and Kuching in Malaysia. The cult maintained its activities even as many members of the overseas Xinghua community rose to positions of considerable wealth through their near monopolization of the transportation sector across Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. They preserved their local ritual traditions during the period of the Cultural Revolution in China, and were well positioned to return to Putian in the 1980s and '90's to rebuild temples, conduct training sessions, and introduce ritual innovations such as female spirit writing groups.
Spriit writing groups dedicated to opening communication with a goddess named Ou Xiangu (Immortal Maiden Ou) were founded in the Tibing Tingi Jiulidong temple in the 1970s. The women in this cult developed a parallel set of initiation rites to that of the men. Successful completion of the initiation training sessions were marked by Daoist and Buddhist diplomas, as in the case of the men. The women now join in the collective group dance of the male mediums and their altar associates. But the women dance counter-clockwise, weaving around through the dance steps of the men, following the flying phoenix forked writing branch that links them to the goddess. The cult of Ou Xiangu was introduced to Putian in 2008, in a series of workshops, Ou Xiangu peishunban 欧仙姑培训班 (Goddess Ou Training Sessions), in the Jiulidong temple in Shiting. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia many women have begun to participate in these initiations. Last year a Xinghua temple in Singapore trained a group of 50 women, the eldest of whom was 80 and the youngest 5. In fact, collective training of spirit mediums has spread across the Xinghua temples in Southeast Asia, even to those whose home communities do not have this ritual tradition (which is found primarily in the Jiangkou region). Spirit medium trainings provide additional solidarity to the XInghua community abroad, and the ability of many members of the community to go into trance and speak in the name of the gods may help combat the tendencies towards the assertion of hierarchy within the temple, based on wealth and social class. In the Jiangkou region of Putian, the training of mediums has been accelerated by the pull of city jobs on young village men. Training sessions used to occur once in a generation, but nowadays they take place every three to five years. Chinese overseas businessmen, who also were trained in their temples around Southeast Asia, frequently return to participate in these training sessions. Their participation extends beyond assisting with financing the initiations to actually participating in the trainings, thereby performing their ritual knowledge and furthering the expansion of the ritual system.
The key point about these continuously transforming local ritual traditions, constantly circulating back and forth from Southeast China to Southeast Asia, is that they were never static, nor were they anything approaching standardized or orthodox, empire wide cults or ritual practices. On the contrary, they were simultaneously both translocal, transnational, even global, and yet at the same time resolutely local and particularistic.
Extended Lineage Networks
The second example of a network or a corridor linking Putian to Southeast Asia is the Huang lineage of Shiting, Putian. Shiting is an elongated super-village which is currently managed by both the Shidong 石东 and the Six 石西 Administrative Villages. The current population is over 10,000 people, and its population of Overseas Chinese living abroad is over 20, 000. The vast majority of the people are of the Huang 黄 surname group. There used to be the Liu 刘 and the Fang 方, but these surnames no longer exist because they either moved away or changed their surnames to Huang. The Huang came from Huangxiang 黄巷 in Hanjiang 涵江 during the Yuan Dynasty. The fifth generation marked the start of the division into four branches. There is an ancestral hall which was built during the Ming Dynasty and renovated in 1987. Currently, Shiting village is divided into four ritual units called respectively: Dementia 大门甲, Zhonghuajia 中华甲, Houcuojia 后厝甲, and Houtingjia 后亭甲.
The Huang lineage of Shiting is the largest lineage group in the Jiangkou region. The lineage was already very numerous in the Ming and Qing. Their ancestors include officials such as Huang Da Sanxiu and Huang Benqing, who were involved in early irrigation projects in the Jiuliyang irrigated plain of Jiangkou. According to the Huang Lineage Genealogy, the founding Fujian ancestor of the Huang had the taboo name of Hu (Tiger), and was born in Dongxiang of Putian city, where he became a Liansheng student. "During the reign of Emperor Shundi of the Yuan (1333-1368) he went to the town of Huangzhai. He is said to have reclaimed land near there from the sea and built a seawall around it. There he built a home and resided, and this place was known as Shiting (Stone Courtyard)." In the fifth generation, the lineage divided into four branches, namely Gongqi 公启, Gongmo 公谟, Gonglie 公烈, and Gongzhuo 公著. At this time the lineage first became large. In the eighth generation, one "Songjuzhe: 松居者 "built a shrine to the ancestors… and donated lands for the sacrificial rituals." Clearly a relatively large lineage organization was developed at that time. The descendants of the Gongmo branch are most numerous, while the line of Gongzhuo has died out. The Gongmo branch has further divided into the Wenlian 文廉 and Wenchang 文 常 branches, so that there are still four major branches of the Huang lineage in Shiting.
After the Huang lineage ancestral hall was rebuilt in 1987 lineage rituals were revived. The lineage chart and the "Map of the distribution of settlements in each Jia" hanging in the Huang Ancestral Hall reveal the close interrelationships and overlapping residential patterns of the four original branches of the lineage, and demonstrate that lineage organization continues to underlie the temple ritual order in Shiting village. In recent years certain sub-branches have organized new god's birthday rituals, with the apparent intention of setting up a fifth Jia ritual organization in addition to the original Four Jia. This indicates the potential for transforming a lineage based ritual system into a temple based ritual order. However, these new ritual groups still participate in the ritual activities of the original Four Jia, and still participate in overall rituals according to their original positions in the lineage system. Thus even though there has been a clear trend within Shiting towards the territorial organization of the ritual order based in local temples, the development of these trends still operates under constraints imposed by lineage organization.
The Huang lineage in Shiting and in Southeast Asia is an important example of a transnational lineage (village). The Huang lineage in Shiting has recently printed (1990) a grand lineage genealogy, which includes the biographies of many recent prominent businessmen and politicians, but which does little to address the question of overseas emigration and its causes. A recent hand-written genealogy of one branch of the Huang lineage provides far more concrete evidence of emigration within one branch of the lineage. This document provides a basis for multisited ethnography on the extended lineage in Shiting and Southeast Asia. This document makes it clear that many members of the Huang lineage sent overseas were adopted sons with no blood ties to the lineage. They were sent over to sink or swim. If successful, they were welcomed back to Shiting, and their ancestral tablets were placed in the ancestral hall.
In the back hall of the Tongtiangong in Seremban, Malaysia, which has one side hall called Jiulidong, dedicated to the spirit medium tradition mentioned above, and another hall dedicated to a replica of a higher order ritual alliance temple on the Putian plain, one finds a shrine dedicated to the ancestors of the Huang lineage. Abbreviated ritual observances take place at dongzhi (Winter solstice) and Qingming. There are more members of the Huang lineage living in Malaysia and Singapore than there are in Shiting. But many of these members are children of second families, or adopted in sons. Others seem to have bought their way into the Huang lineage to take advantage of its numbers, its facilities and its business connections. These members are in effect purchasing shares in a trans-national joint-stock corporation, in a form of the lineage described by Zheng Zhenman (2001) as a contractual lineage (hetong zongzu). Flexible membership in "invented" lineages is a common phenomenon in Southeast Asia. One might well ask if this model originated overseas in Southeast Asia, or back in China -where it was often adopted by smaller lineages faced with the pressure of a large lineage. In any case, the experience of flexible associational principles amongst Chinese overseas must have had a considerable impact on their home villages and regions. The merging of lineages stretched to the breaking point with business and trading networks generated a wealth of managerial experience that surely expanded the cultural repertoire of the home villages, towns, and cities of the Xinghua region.
Buddhist networks
The third and final example of religious networks to be discussed is a Buddhist network linking master and disciple from Putian to Southeast China. In this case one finds the intersecting of multiple Xinghua network strands involved in the rebuilding of the ancient Buddhist monastery, the Guishansi (Turtle Mountain Monastery) back in Huating in Putian. The ancient Buddhist monastery of Guishan had been founded by legendary monks Wuliao and his disciple Huizhong in the Tang, (C.E. 822), and repaired many times over the year (888, 915, 1324-30, 1368-98, 1459, 1611, 1679) , and again in 1906, when a new order was established, and monks were sent overseas to develop the monasteries networks (for early inscriptions see Dean and Zheng, 1995) . At various times the monastery housed over 500 monks, and relied on its extensive tea plantation for income. The monastery was repaired in the later 1950s, but was completely flattened during the Cultural Revolution. In the Republican period, monks from this monastery somehow made their way to one of the key Chinese temples in Southeast Asia, the Qingyunting (Blue Cloud Pavillion) in Malacca (founded in 1673 by Hokkien merchants). This was the temple where the future Chinese leaders of Singapore, the Straits Chinese, maintained their base. The temple had evolved from a Dazhongmiao, a place of Buddhist rites for the commemoration of the dead, into a temple dedicated to the great gods and goddesses of the Minnan coastal trading network, including Mazu, or TIanhou, Goddess of the Sea. The leaders of this temple were the appointed Kapitan or directors of the Chinese community under the Dutch. Under English colonial rule, they changed their title to that of Tingzhu (Master of the Temple).
The first Putian monk to run Buddhist services at the Qingyuting was Xianglin Fashi (d. 1937), a Buddhist monk from the Guishansi. He performed rituals for the dead and held Dharma Assemblies at the Qingyunting, beginning in 1929. Since then, six more generations of master-disciple transmission have received their ordinations within the monastery, judging from the spirit-tablet altar at the back of the temple. These disciples spread to several Buddhist monasteries around Southeast Asia, including the Jingyesi in nearby Muar on the Malacca Strait, and further afield to Jakarta and Surubaya. The successor of Xianglin Fashi was Master Jinxing . His brother monk Master Jinming was the founder of the Xianglin Monastery, built in commemoration of the founding monk of the Guishansi order, in 1985.
The initiative to rebuild the founding temple of Guishansi in 1986 was led by a monk from the Jingyesi (Monastery of Pure Works) named Master Dingguang, and was completed by his disciple Master Zhen Jing (True Scripture). They worked tirelessly to bring together all the different strands of the diverse Xinghua temple networks across Southeast Asia. Their contributions proved so enormous that they were able to rebuild the Guishansi into a huge temple complex. They also built a road up the steep mountain to the temple at the top. Master Zhen Jing had enough money left over to completely rebuild his entire home village, Yuantoucun, along with a school and a clinic. There was even enough money left over to rebuild another Buddhist monastery, the Xianglinsi (Monastery of the Fragrant Grove), originally founded in 1945, right across the road from the Qingyunting. This monastery is now even larger than the Qingyunting. Inside it, one finds plaques bearing the names of the donors. These include the various Xinghua Huiguan of Malacca and Singapore and elsewhere around Malaysia. Numerous Buddhist monasteries supported by the XInghua community such as the Guanyinting of Jakarta (itself currently undergoing a massive reconstruction) made contributions. But one also finds mention of several Xinghua Tianhougong temples dedicated to Mazu from around Southeast Asia, as well as some of the Three in One and Jiulidong Spirit Medium Altar Association temples of Singapore on the plaques.
These plaques reveal that the multiple networks of the Xinghua temple systems could converge on a single node and generate very substantial resources reconnecting that node back to the founding monastery in Putian. This example also brings out the importance of mobilizing figures like the Buddhist monks Xianglin, Jinxing, Jinming, Dingguan, and Zhen Jing. These men personify the concept of connective capital (Ichniowski, C and Shaw, K, 2005; Barnes, 2007) , and they devoted their lives to assisting in the transference of economic capital into religious merit. This example also shows that the Xinghua networks cannot be studied in isolation, but should be seen as part of a larger pattern of interactions back and forth with Putian, which has accumulated cultural and economic resources, managerial experience, and business connections over multiple generations.
Conclusions
The role of Chinese overseas in 20 th century Chinese modernization projects has been both passionate and paradoxical. For many overseas Chinese elites, the 1911 Revolution and the rise of a new China propelled them into a series of reforms in the fields of education, urban planning and village renewal, architecture, ritual and life-style changes. There were several instances of villages being completely redesigned in the name of re-imagined Chinese tradition. Some went so far as to organize military units to protect their home villages during the turbulent years of the early Republic. Subsequent relations with the PRC after 1949 were even more fraught and contradictory. The Overseas Chinese saw their role as both preserving tradition and simultaneously advocating the modernization of China. When they thought in the 1950s and 1960s that they could no longer return to China, there was an immediate spike in Singapore in the construction of temples dedicated to the gods of their home villages across South and Southeast China. Aside from the Cultural Revolution period, throughout the 20 th century, alongside the building of roads, schools, hospitals and factories, there was a steady flow of support (remittances, ritual knowledge, networking) for the construction or repair of traditional ancestral halls, temples, and Buddhist monasteries. One might well ask why ritual activity in contemporary China is not simply an archaic survival of "tradition", but instead is precisely the site of the current negotiation of the forces of modernity in Southeast China.
From one point of view, the people within these religious networks and corridors seem to live in a parallel reality in which the Cultural Revolution, or indeed, many of the other revolutions of the 20 th century (political, social, technological), did not take place, and would appear to have had little impact on the ritual traditions they consider most fundamental to their (trans)local identities. But this view would underestimate the impact of continuous ritual revolutions on Chinese society. Ritual traditions evolve and rework other forces, and many ritual events contain both the possibility of radical change, and the means to re-establish or re-invent social order. Major transformations of Chinese society have been traced to the "ritual revolution" of the 16 th century, when lineage ritual spread throughout the Pearl River area (Faure 2007) . In our study of the historical evolution of the ritual sphere in the Putian plains, we argued that contemporary rituals build upon and fold in ritual procedures from many traditions and strata -early Buddhist traditions, Daoist rites, lineage rites, village and ritual alliance rites, spirit medium traditions, classicial sacrificial rites, and sectarian rites (Dean and Zheng, 2010, Vol.1) . Ritual events are characterized by multiple liturgical frameworks, multiple temporalities, and multiple nodes of perception on the event as a whole. Each of these points of view or nodes of interaction within the ritual even has a great potential for autonomy in relation to other nodes and to the deities. This is a key reason why ritual activities in Fujian province are able to work with and transmute state capital, global capital, and local economies. The danger, of course, is that local, state, or global formations will exploit the autonomies of the ritual event in order to frame the temporality of modernity against the multiple temporalities of the ritual event, as a simple and indifferent opposition. The best one could hope for in such circumstances would be a form of alternative modernity, which would simply delay the inevitable subsumption of all relations by capital. This is a real danger because the power of capital also lies in its immanence, in its ability to work within and transform hierarchical formations of local powers. This movement of capital tends to generate contradictions in the ritual space of non-contradictions, which then usually demand resolution in the form of local or national identity.
Both ritual and capital produce worlds. As Lazzarato puts it, "How (are we) to understand concepts of labor, production, cooperation and communication when capitalism is not only a mode of production but a production of worlds?" (Lazzarato 2004:34) . The infinitesimal world production of the ritual event asks us to think differently from capital but not oppositionally. It bids us to consider the differently different between capital and ritual. For the ritual event is not simply an obstacle to the movement of capital or a contradiction within it. The promise of what I have described elsewhere as a "microsociology" of contemporary ritual activities in southeast China lies in the attention it calls to the production of worlds within ritual events. The continuing power of these ritual events to absorb and yet not be completely transformed by flows of global capital raises important questions as to the negotiation of modernity in contemporary Putian.3 Another threat to the vitality of the village rituals of the Putian plain is the rapid spread of urbanization. Strange to say, in the Putian case, the increasing polarization between urban and rural realms seems strangely productive, in that many internal migrants sojourning in urban centers, as well as the Chinese soujouning overseas, return to the villages at Chinese New Year celebrations and pour incredible amounts of funding and energy (personal participation) into village ritual events. Thus at an extreme, these villages sometimes appear to be empty shells, with only elderly inhabitants looking after a few children. Nonetheless, they come to life in explosive festivals at New Years, and, with improved transportation links, often at the important birthday festivals of the village deities. I have recently explored the realms of ritual sensation found in these festivals in a documentary film called Bored in Heaven (2010) . In some contested suburbs of Putian, villagers have succeeded in forcing the government to pay for the relocation of their temples in amongst the apartment blocks. These temples so far have maintained their ritual activities. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Xiamen, where the outlying villages that were gradually absorbed into the expanding city have largely preserved their temples, which have now formed powerful regional associations with strong ties to Taiwanese temple networks. Many spectacular roadside temples are being built, even closer to the center of Xiamen. Thinking local or regional history from the point of view of locally emergent modes of power does not deny the rather overwhelming evidence for the high degree of the cultural hegemony of the Confucian state in late imperial China-but it does show the limits of such analysis. No doubt there were many local cultural nexuses of power, different power formations, including ritualpower formations, lineage-power formations, and a wide variety of other local modes of channeling and organizing power across China. Rather than see power only from the imperial perspective as the imposition of a culturally defined unified, hierarchically encompassing, continuum of cosmic authority stretching from the Altar of Heaven to each household shrine to the stove god, we can instead make out a far more complex landscape of alternative workings of local powers and local performances of power. I have suggested here that another of the sources of power and ritual change were the corridors and networks linking the coastal communities of Southeast China to Southeast Asia.
In the ritual events of the Putian plain the power being generated and performed is that of particular communities or ritual alliances expressing a degree of autonomy. One of those powers is the power to generate worlds of difference within ritual that are not absorbed into modernization (cultural tourism) or state control (cultural museumification) but remain vital cosmopolitical resources for villagers in the contemporary Putian region (see Dean and Lamarre 2003; . These cosmopolitical ritual technologies were transportable, like the portable altar of a Daoist priest or the incense ash of a local god's temple, and they were employed in a great variety of different political and multi-ethnic settings around Southeast Asia. Still the gods appeared, and the rituals continued to evolve in adapting to new environments.
The intrinsic cultural hybridity of the villages of South and Southeast China, combined with their openess to transnational trade and cultural contact, well-established by the Song, and the highly flexible associational forms developed throughout these networks to respond to continually changing conditions at home and abroad, suggest that we conceive of the villages of this region not primarily in terms of how they identified with the imperial center, but rather how they grew to recognize and work with their own differences from that central model, by developing and fostering trans-local social spaces and networks, and creating a consciously hybrid set of distinct cultures which only appear to be local and regional and earthbound from the imperial perspective, but in fact were always already hybrid, translocal, transnational, and continuously transforming.4
It should be emphasized that the networks of the Xinghua Chinese in Southeast Asia also exhibit clear signs of mutual competition, internal conflict, and coercion and exclusivity. For example, there are four different Xinghua Huiguan (regional associations) in Singapore, representing distinct economic classes, regional sub-groups, and even different religious traditions. The Christian Methodists of Putian decided to move up the Rajang river into Borneo, rather than to follow patterns of chain migration to safer and more established enclaves of Xinghua people in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia. Only later, once they had established themselves in Sibu, did they branch out into the major cities of Southeast Asia. The story of the struggle for political and cultural independence of Christian groups in Fujian goes back several centuries, and is one of the keys to understanding the transformation of public spaces and modes of agency and social institutional change in late Qing and Republican times.
Many of the mutually independent temples of the farflung Jiulidong (Nine Carp Cavern) temple system were founded by spirit mediums who had quarreled with one another, and split off to form new religious communities with their own Altar Association. To this day, these temples compete over influence and control over the founding temple in Shiting, which has been rebuilt by different Overseas Chinese temple groups three times in the past twenty years. And extended lineages are embroiled in constant disputes over status and the criteria of membership.
In spite of these tensions, in some circumstances networks can join forces, as shown above in the case of the Guishansi. Hard-won membership in an extended lineage leads to many new connections and possibilities. Participation in these networks comes with its own regimes of exchange and reciprocity. New members are mobilized into networks, swept up into new flows. Ritual techniques (like spirit possession) can be imitated and adapted by groups (or genders) that did not originally share these practices in their home villages in Putian. The increasing ease of telecommunications between temple and network leaders, and the ability of overseas temple members to travel rapidly back to Putian, has brought many of these networks into closer interaction, in an ever-intensifying rate of flow, back and forth within the trans-local networks of the Xinghua extended community. Cell-phones, digital cameras and videos, and a host of hand-held devices allow for images and information to flow through the system at ever-increasing volume and velocity. In many respects, the spectacular nature of Chinese popular religious ritual takes on a new power in the digital age, amplified by viral means of transmission. Nowadays, virtual temples populate the Internet, merit from the performance of (virtual?) rituals can be purchased on-line with a credit card, and Buddhist rites are broadcast across the internet in real-time. The Chinese religious networks linking South and Southeast China to Southeast Asia and beyond are exploring new modes of communication to enhance connectivity and speed the transmission of ideas and information and the expansion of their social networks. At times like these, one senses that the God of Theater is having the last laugh on the Nationalist and Communist advocates of the secular modernization of China. 
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